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Dispute Resolution in Pandemic Circumstances 
 
George A. Bermann, Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law, Walter Gellhorn Professor of Law; 
Director, Center for International Commercial and Investment Arbitration, Columbia Law 
School 
 
The peaceful resolution of disputes is among the most important earmarks of a regime 
attached to the rule of law.  Even in countries in which, for one reason or another, courts do not 
work especially well, civil peace is of paramount importance.  The absence of effective 
institutions for the administration of justice between and among private parties would spell a 
high degree of social disorder. 
Even in the absence of a crisis such as we are experiencing, justice systems face a number 
of challenges in this day and age. Does a jurisdiction have a sufficient number of persons qualified 
to administer justice, and what are the consequences of a shortfall?  In the same vein, is civil 
justice operating under formalities that generate delays disproportionate to the purposes they 
serve?  Do the procedures that are in place sufficiently allow parties to adequately present their 
case and adequately rebut their adversary’s? Is access to justice prohibitively expensive, most 
likely due less to court costs than to costs of representation by counsel? Are there safeguards in 
place to ensure the independence and impartiality of decisionmakers, and do they work? Is 
institutional bias or corruption a problem? Overall, does a justice system exhibit the qualities 
widely viewed as essential:  procedural fairness, accuracy, and efficiency? 
Long-distance Justice  
These are concerns we have even in ordinary times, and irrespective of any exogenous 
factors may come into play.  It is on top of these concerns that there have now emerged a whole 
new set of concerns traceable to the circumstances in which the prevalence of the Coronavirus 
has placed us.  Some of these have never arisen before, at least not in the magnitude we are 
experiencing.  How great a threat are they to the principles upon which our justice systems have 
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been built, and how can they be addressed most fairly and workably?  How must we alter our 
modes of conduct in order to serve the purposes that our activities are meant to achieve, and to 
what extent are those changes technologically and humanly feasible?   
In the discussion thus far, reference has been made, if only implicitly, to courts of law. 
However, civil disputes are obviously no longer resolved solely in national courts. They can be 
resolved amicably or through mediation or conciliation. But, especially in international 
transactions, arbitration has become an especially favored mode of dispute resolution.  
The most important challenges for the administration of justice, whether judicial or 
arbitral, is obviously technological. As a result of the pandemic, the great majority of business 
and professional interactions are now taking place strictly online, and the administration of 
justice is no exception.  This means big change. This is due largely to the fact that, particularly in 
litigation, but much less so in arbitration, we have traditionally operated on the assumption that 
the proceedings associated with the administration of justice take place in-person, with parties, 
counsel, witnesses, and court reporters all performing their roles in the presence of one another 
and, of course, in the presence of the adjudicator.  This assumption must be jettisoned.  
Virtual Proceedings 
 It is important to distinguish at the outset between phases of litigation or arbitration that 
are conducted “before” a judge or arbitrator and those that are not.  In a great many 
circumstances, counsel traditionally perform their tasks and interact directly with opposing 
counsel without involvement of a court or tribunal. Pleadings, briefs and memorials are as easily 
submitted to the court or tribunal as well as opposing counsel as they have been up to now, i.e., 
remotely, via email or courier service.  That is equally the case for pre-trial discovery and 
settlement negotiations.  
Attention is therefore best focused on those moments in which proceedings ordinarily 
take place before a court or tribunal.  Some proceedings before a court or tribunal, such as case 
management conferences, have also for a long while been performed at a distance, whether 
telephonically or online. Therefore, what remains to be considered are mostly hearings 
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themselves. These are the occasions when “change of venue” from a physical courtroom to a 
virtual courtroom stands to be most disruptive.  
Even so, thanks to available platforms such as Zoom, there is no obvious reason why what 
transpires in a physical courtroom or hearing room cannot largely be replicated online.  All that 
is required is that the judge or tribunal chair establish a meeting and invite all relevant parties to 
participate. These platforms appear to accommodate as many persons as are ever likely to 
participate in any given proceeding. As a result, an online hearing should unfold mostly as it 
would in person. Oral argument can obviously be performed online, as can examination and 
cross-examination of witnesses, transcription by a court reporter, or interpretation to and from 
a foreign language, with no one needing to be in the same room.  To this extent, the situation is 
not unlike those university professors, such as myself, who conduct their classes online. 
The Arbitration Scene 
The use of video-conferenced hearings in arbitration was already well advanced when the 
pandemic struck.  Online hearings have been a technological reality for some time. The 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which administers the 
lion’s share of investor-State arbitrations, reports that it sees every year a steady uptick in the 
number of hearings online.  In 2019, about 60 per cent of the 200 hearings and sessions organized 
by ICSID were held by video-conference. Indeed, “block-chain” arbitration, which is obviously 
100% online, is a reality, if by no means yet a widely popular one. 
ICSID reports that its video-conferencing platform does not require special hardware or 
software and that a computer with an internet connection and webcam is sufficient for effective 
and secure participation. Hearings with hundreds of participants have been held online. The 
available platforms are sufficiently sophisticated for the purpose.  All participants have the ability 
to share audio and video, as well as content such as PowerPoint presentations. A virtual chat 
function allows participants to communicate individually strictly with one another or with the 
entire group. A virtual court stenographer provides a real-time transcript of the proceeding, 
visible to all participants on the video-conference. Particularly in arbitration, but also in litigation, 
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demonstratives, as they are called, are increasingly in use.  It makes little difference whether they 
are exhibited by power-point online rather than in a hearing room.   
Thus, arbitral chairs (and solo arbitrators) are readily acting as hosts, convening sessions 
online, by inviting participants in whatever manner the platform in use provides.  It is not proving 
particularly difficult for participants to learn how to navigate the platform that an arbitrator 
selects, whatever shape individual learning curves may take.  This process is well underway in a 
large number of arbitral proceedings, with no particular technical difficulties. 
Although individual arbitrators are proving capable of launching and managing an online 
arbitration, nothing prevents the arbitral institutions, such as the American Arbitration 
Association or the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration, under 
whose aegis the vast majority of arbitrations take place, from establishing an institution-wide 
system available to all tribunals proceeding under their auspices.  This is happening in ICSID, 
which has its own online system, that it is making available also to arbitrations conducted under 
other institutional rules or the UNCITRAL Rules. There is an ICSID hearings team that works 
directly not only with the tribunal, but also with the parties, so that they perform their role with 
confidence. ICSID IT staff members are present throughout hearings to ensure they run smoothly.  
It is already apparent that all the other leading arbitral institutions are heading down the same 
path.  
The Litigation Scene 
Arbitral institutions appear to be significantly ahead of the courts. According to reports, 
at present, judges are scrambling individually to equip themselves with Zoom and like 
technologies, and it is not clear that courts are developing video-conference systems for use by 
all their individual judges in the fashion in which arbitral institutions are developing such systems 
for their tribunals.  It would clearly be advisable for them to do so.   
 
The Administrative Office of the US Courts recently made the following 




● to hold in-person court proceedings only when absolutely necessary, utilizing 
videoconferencing or audio-conferencing capabilities where practicable 
● to conduct jury proceedings only in exceptional circumstances 
● to limit the number of family members who attend proceedings 
● to stagger scheduling of critical court proceedings to reduce the number of people in 
seating galleries, wells of courtrooms, conference rooms, and public waiting areas, and 
● to limit staff at critical courtroom proceedings to fewer than 10 people, and ensure that 
they are at least six feet apart.1  
As can be seen from this inventory, it is by no means anticipated that all judicial 
proceedings will take place online.  While in-person court proceedings are to take place “only 
when absolutely necessary,” they are evidently expected, at least to some extent, to continue.  
Only if they were to continue, would, for example, it be necessary to “stagger scheduling of 
critical court proceedings to reduce the number of people in seating galleries, wells of 
courtrooms, conference rooms, and public waiting areas” or “limit staff at critical courtroom 
proceedings to fewer than 10 people, and ensure that they are at least six feet apart.” State court 
systems are moving at different rhythms; some have no choice but to go online (or else suspend 
activity altogether, at least temporarily), since some state courthouses are closed due to the fact 
that persons found to be virus-infected had recently attended proceedings there. But there is 
progress.  The American Bar Association very recently conducted an instructional webinar in 




The fact that courts and tribunals are equipped to carry on business reasonably well does 
not mean that nothing changes.  One need only visualize how court and arbitral proceedings 
ordinarily unfold. Consider witness testimony. A witness may be examined remotely, but 
something is inevitably lost in the process. Clearly the opportunity for counsel and court or 
                                                             




tribunal to observe a witness’ demeanor is greatly reduced.  Body-language remains unseen.  Nor 
is there any way to know to what extent, if at all, a witness, in testifying is being coached by 
someone sitting next to him or her, but not visible on a screen, or is consulting documents that 
he or she would not be permitted to consult in a courtroom or hearing room.  
There is much discussion of the impact of the pandemic on the conduct of jury trials. It is 
entirely possible for jurors to observe civil and criminal proceedings on line, once their home 
computers are equipped, or even to deliberate online, but the absence of physical proximity 
between jurors and witnesses, as well as among jurors while deliberating, cannot help but make 
a difference. Moreover, many of the ground rules governing the conduct of jury trials presuppose 
a degree of sequestration of jurors from others – though, ironically not much of a problem with 
the current prevalence of shelter-in-place orders.   
In litigation, counsel may approach the bench to address the judge beyond hearing by 
others. Similarly, in arbitration, members of the tribunal, faced with a difficult objection by 
counsel, will retire from the hearing to the tribunal’s breakout room, or simply the corridor, to 
exchange views and reach a ruling.  Ways must be developed by which this can take place without 
hearing by others in the “room”.  It is common, again in arbitration, for fact witnesses to be 
sequestered while other fact witnesses testify, so as to disable witnesses from molding or 
tailoring their testimony in accordance with what another witness may have said.  Now, the 
witness will need to be removed from the room technologically.  
Similarly, counsel ordinarily take signals from the way in which adjudicators physically 
react to their oral advocacy or examination of witnesses, whether by grimaces or raised 
eyebrows, or hopefully a benign countenance. There can essentially be no movement on the part 
of those who are speaking. Changes in advocacy styles may well result. Put more simply, we are 
accustomed to experiencing litigation and arbitration as theater.  Much of the cast will be present 
at all times during online hearings, but not all visible to one another, with the element of drama 
necessarily subsiding. With the move to online adjudication, the atmosphere will have undergone 
a profound, if subtle, change, in these and so many other ways, the implications of which will 




 One of the first things courts and tribunals do, once assembled, is establish a calendar for 
the proceedings.  Arbitral tribunals, more so than courts, are likely to produce early on a calendar 
reflecting the entire length of the proceedings, from beginning to end, procedural step by 
procedural step.  Deadlines abound, not only in the calendar, but over time.  Uncalendared 
motions will be made, in the wake of which all parties will be given a fixed deadline by which to 
state a position.   
 Some proceedings will have been well underway by the time the dislocation and 
disruption occasioned by the pandemic have occurred.  The proceedings will have to be 
conducted differently midstream.  Short-term delays are inevitable. But for all the reasons stated 
above, courts and tribunals have it largely within their means to adapt usual litigation and 
arbitration activities to the demands of the technologies that will now govern.  We have no choice 
but to believe that courts and tribunals will exercise the good judgment and common sense we 
ascribe to them in making the necessary rulings on requests for relaxing the ground rules and, in 
doing so, striking a sound balance between efficiency and fairness. 
 It is also a watchword of both litigation and arbitration that the parties to a dispute must 
enjoy “equality of arms,” i.e., an equal opportunity to make their case and refute their 
opponent’s.  As courts and tribunals make whatever adjustments they do to the calendar, they 
need to be correspondingly sensitive to due process in all its manifestations. 
Conclusion 
 It is useful in conclusion to put what has been said in a somewhat larger perspective. 
First, how does the magnitude of the “upheaval” – to use a somewhat hyperbolic term – 
in the administration of justice compare to the upheaval to be experienced in other fields of 
endeavor.  Some fields of endeavor may be adapted to the technologies at our disposal more 
readily than others and, conversely, technologies may be adapted to some fields more readily 
than others.  
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It may work to the advantage of litigation and arbitration that both entail well-established 
staged forms of activity, marked by a more or less recurring set of discrete steps. No litigation or 
arbitration is “routine,” but these activities do tend to be “routinized.” No less important, dispute 
resolution is largely a matter of words, oral or written. A sphere of activity in which words loom 
so large lends itself well to the technology to which we are all turning for the conduct of business 
and professional activity under present circumstances. 
Second, some activities were already set on a novel technological path long before the 
pandemic occurred.  Such is the case of arbitration and, unfortunately, much less so in the case 
of litigation.  Already years ago, the arbitration community was on a quest to make fuller use of 
available technologies.  A law journal dedicated to that very purpose – The Journal of Technology 
in International Arbitration – was established some time ago and is prospering. The motivation 
for technological innovation in arbitration, much like the motivation for “expedited” or “fast-
track” proceedings, was largely one of economy in time and cost, to which concerns over 
consumer arbitration have contributed. Thus, adaptation to a pandemic was not required in 
order for this transformation to take place. In other words, greater and better use of technology 
was already identified as distinctly in arbitration’s best interests and, according to some, 
inevitable. If that is the case, the present pandemic is only hastening arbitration’s progress, albeit 
somewhat precipitously, down a path it was destined to travel anyway. 
Reform in civil procedure reform has always moved at a distinctly slower pace than reform 
in arbitral procedure.  Arbitral institutions operate in a highly competitive market, revising their 
rules every several years, if only to borrow innovations that other arbitral institutions will have 
recently introduced.  For the most part no such competition prevails in civil litigation at the 
national level, and the intervals between procedural reforms are decades – many decades – 
rather than years. For these and other reasons, modernization in civil litigation has not kept pace 
with modernization in arbitration.  But the functionality of national court systems depends on 
closing that gap. The present crisis makes that only more apparent and can be a catalyst for 
change. 
 
